Frightening lack of leadership in the war on Naxals

Ajay Shukla, uprisings through dozens of floundering after six decades, India's government is facing Naxalite threat as ever writes incoherently

French diplomat Charles Maurice de Bourbon Talleyrand family and unmatched wordsmith's comment - after the Napoleonic wars and back to his old excesses to restore power - "that they forgot nothing and learned nothing."

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh last month was incorrect Naxalite "insurgency, India's biggest internal security" challenge calling. He first used the description three years ago and, if it remains so even today, India's biggest internal security challenge its ruling elite is the strategic bankruptcy.

Appalling lack of leadership is clear. Dantewada defeat two months after Home Affairs (Moha) Ministry of reality is only now that its traditional response Rebellion Defense (MoD) through the Ministry of money - - is not an option yet absorbed. By a military overstretched prompted, Defence Minister AK Antony, the Rashtriya Rifles troops and elite special forces to use "force the pace of offensive operations" Moha has blocked the request.

Accommodation reached by the Cabinet - only for training "and" demining - Understanding culture that shapes our answers to important questions of national security forces using reeks. Steel has been sprinkled over the pot enough military potential criticism that the Cabinet did not take firm steps to deflect, but enough to criticism that the military does not generate the boundaries were being sidetracked.

This move hardly likely to rein in the Maoists systemic ineffectiveness of the police forces gave them both the states and Centre. But the presence of action was necessary, and criticism has been put on the next crisis.

Long before it come home minister P Chidambaram's approach is clear. Inspirational leadership no Churchill, but the verbal and moral gymnastics that British wartime PM rivaling, Chidambaram claimed a "broad mandate to deal with Naxalite demands even as he forces the discharge of its primary functions of the Central Police Organisations units for to demand ": the state police in maintaining law and order ie reinforcing.

His ministry, meanwhile, continues to pay. This week, Moha chief ministers of Naxal-affected states (a term that is the official dictionary entry is inviting the Cabinet Committee on Security "for a meeting!) So that their suggestions on strengthening the police and paramilitary forces" being sought can.

Chidambaram can answer why only those - who squarely through the Home Ministry is blamed for leaking naxal - CMS are now being asked for suggestions. Obviously, Moha to blame for the failure of police wants to spread thin, the fact that ride on constitutional law and order is a state subject. But CPOs, who worked directly under Moha and long operated on in Naxal-affected states?

Moha CPOs for such indifference - some 7.5 million armed policemen Central Reserve Police Force, Border Security Force, CISF, ITBP and others - which officials refer to the top Moha them as "paramilitary ".

The only difference is academic, given that Dantewada defeats and blunders before others stem from the CPO and professional units, which hardly could have happened under the military authorities. Moha cynically premature to many soldiers in the Army who retired after only seven years to make concrete proposals include CPO potential is stymied. Key reasons proffered by Moha: The direct hiring promotion prospects would harm police.

Another reason is that Interior Ministry troops in the laterally CPOs tells rejects proposal to create massive military force in dealing with the Indians would not be acceptable to the institutional orientation. The reasoning, ruthlessly Related CRPF men face a hail of bullets to the Naxalites, while ironically, has been completely dismissed as regular Army units in Jammu and Kashmir less than their counterparts in the CPO has been restrained.

CPO turf is protected Given Moha approach and direct involvement in the Defence Ministry on the minimalist approach to anti-Naxalite campaign, CPOs compact for military training is doomed to failure. In the past five years, the Army's most experienced instructors - a Brigadier (retired), Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School in Mizoram BK Ponwar - Jungle Warfare College in Bastar state Chhattisgarh Police has trained more than 10,000. Most of them do not fight the Naxalites have moved, but state police officers for private security jobs is soft on the details. A policeman can be trained easily, but changing the police culture is far more difficult. The same is true of CPOs.

France also said, "because the public always eager for something to believe they have nothing to gain, so easy to arrange as facts." It is that New Delhi has yet to take on Naxals all.